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I. INTRODUCTION
Mortgage securitization, subprime lending, a persistently weak housing market, 
and an explosion of residential mortgage defaults – today’s homeowners and banks 
face a new and challenging landscape. Recently, courts in several states have issued 
decisions that alter the terrain for mortgage foreclosures. In Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, and New york, among other states, courts have dismissed foreclosure actions on 
the basis of what might seem to be highly technical deficiencies in the pleading or 
proof. The most well-known – and controversial – in this cluster of cases is U.S. Bank 
National Ass’n v. Ibanez,1 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
this year. In Ibanez, the court held that two assignee banks failed to obtain legal title to 
foreclosed properties because they failed to prove that they held valid assignments of 
the foreclosed mortgages at the moment that the foreclosure proceedings were begun.
The apparent attitude of the courts in these cases can be best summarized by the 
statement of a New york judge in a comparable context: that courts will not be mere 
“automatons mindlessly processing paper motions in mortgage foreclosure actions[,] 
most of which proceed on default.”2 Rather, in these cases, courts have held banks, 
other lenders, and securitized trusts to strict proof of what might otherwise seem to 
be fairly inferred facts and contractual obligations.
Are these decisions best seen as misguided attempts to temporarily save homeown-
ers (and others) from the pain of foreclosure actions – delays that waste judicial and 
litigants’ time – when we consider that these foreclosures will, in any event, eventually 
occur? Or are they justified decisions which establish substantive norms that the real 
conditions of real estate financing in the twenty-first century demand?
In this Issue Brief, we maintain that the decisions in these cases are not extreme 
examples of judicial hyper-technicality run amok. Rather, they are attempts to ad-
dress the radically new foreclosure realities in the age of mortgage securitization and 
subprime lending – realities that existing laws, on many levels, are inadequate to 
address.
II. THE CASES IN QUESTION: IBANEZ AND OTHERS
The Ibanez case was actually two cases, consolidated for hearing. Both dealt with 
foreclosure actions against homeowners whose mortgages were securitized, prior to 
foreclosure, through a series of complicated transactions.
* Dean and Professor, University of Maine School of Law.
** J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. This Issue Brief was first re-
leased by ACS in October 2011.
1 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011).
2 M&T Mortg. Corp. v. Foy, 858 N.y.S.2d 567, 572 (N.y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
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In the first case, Antonio Ibanez borrowed $103,500 for the purchase of a home in 
Springfield, Massachusetts. The lender was Rose Mortgage, and the loan was secured 
by a mortgage which listed Ibanez as the mortgagor and Rose as the mortgagee. The 
mortgage was recorded with the local registry of deeds.3
Several days later, Rose executed an assignment of this mortgage in blank – that is, 
with no specification of the party to whom it would be transferred. At some point, the 
name “Option One Mortgage Corporation” was stamped in the blank space, as the 
assignee. This assignment was recorded. After the stamping, but before recording, 
Option One executed an assignment of the mortgage in blank. According to U.S. 
Bank, the mortgage was eventually assigned to: Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB; then to 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.; then to Structured Asset Securities Corporation; and, 
ultimately pooled with approximately 1,220 other mortgage loans and assigned to 
U.S. Bank as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-z. This transaction effectively converted the mort-
gages into mortgage-backed securities that were sold to investors (a process known as 
securitization).4
On July 5, 2007, U.S. Bank foreclosed on the Ibanez property through a statutorily 
granted power of sale. Under Massachusetts law, a mortgage holder does not have to 
obtain judicial authorization to foreclose on a mortgaged property, if the power to 
foreclose is granted by the mortgage itself.5 The entity holding the mortgage need 
only publish notice of intent to foreclose and send notice by registered mail to the 
property owner of record. At the foreclosure sale, U.S. Bank purchased the Ibanez 
property for itself. The purchase price was significantly less than the amount of the 
outstanding debt and the estimated market value of the property.6
In September, 2008 – more than a year later – U.S. Bank brought an action in court 
to quiet title to the Ibanez property. In particular, U.S. Bank sought a declaration that 
any right, title, or interest of the mortgagor (Ibanez) had been extinguished by the 
foreclosure sale, and that title was vested in the Bank.7
The case that was consolidated with Ibanez for hearing followed a similar pattern. 
In that case, Mark and Tammy LaRace gave a mortgage for property in Springfield, 
Massachusetts to Option One Mortgage Corporation on May 19, 2005. The mort-
gage was security for a $103,200 loan. The mortgage was recorded in the local registry 
of deeds on that day. One week later, Option One executed an assignment of the 
LaRace mortgage in blank. It was later claimed that the mortgage was assigned to 
Bank of America on July 28, 2005, as part of a flow sale and servicing agreement. 
Bank of America was later claimed to have assigned it to Asset Backed Funding 
Corporation (ABFC) in an October 1, 2005 mortgage loan purchase agreement. ABFC 
later pooled the mortgage with others and assigned it to Wells Fargo as trustee for the 
group of now securitized mortgages.8
On July 5, 2007, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the LaRace mortgage, using the same 
statutory power of sale as used in the Ibanez case. At the foreclosure sale, Wells Fargo 
3 Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 45-46.
4 See id. at 46.
5 See id. at 49; MAss. gEN. LAws ch. 244, § 14 (2011).
6 See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 44, 47.
7 See id. at 44.
8 See id. at 47-48.
 The Journal of the ACS Issue Groups 133 
purchased the LaRace property for itself. The purchase price was more than the out-
standing debt, but significantly less than the property’s estimated market value.9
In October of 2008 – more than year after the foreclosure sale – Wells Fargo brought 
a quiet title action, requesting a court declaration that any right, title, or interest that 
the LaRaces had in the property was extinguished, and a declaration that title was 
vested in Wells Fargo.10
In both cases, the mortgagors – Ibanez and the LaRaces – did not initially answer 
the complaints in the quiet title actions, and U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo moved for 
entry of default judgments against them. At a case management conference, a judge 
of the Massachusetts Land Court raised the issue of whether U.S. Bank and Wells 
Fargo were entitled to foreclose on the properties in view of the fact that the assign-
ments of the mortgages to them were not executed or recorded until after the foreclo-
sure complaints were filed and the foreclosure sales were held.11 In other words, al-
though U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo represented in the notices for the foreclosure sales 
that they were the mortgage holders, they – in truth – had not yet been assigned the 
mortgages. The assignment to U.S. Bank was executed more than one year after the 
foreclosure sale in the case of the Ibanez property, and the assignment to Wells Fargo 
was executed ten months after the foreclosure sale, in the LaRace case. (The court 
found that this was true, even though the La Race assignment to Wells Fargo declared 
a date that preceded the foreclosure sale.) The explanation for this state of affairs in 
both cases was that “the use of postsale assignments was customary in the industry.”12
The legal question, thus, was whether an entity which claimed that it was the legal 
holder of a mortgage at the time of foreclosure, but – in fact – could not prove that it 
was, could foreclose because the mortgage was proven to have been later assigned to 
it. The appellate court held that it could not. Stressing the power that the statutory 
scheme grants to mortgage holders – i.e., the power to foreclose without judicial over-
sight – the court held that “one who sells under a power [of sale] must follow strictly 
its terms”.13 The court noted that “[o]ne of the terms of the power of sale . . . is the 
restriction on who is entitled to foreclose.”14 Only a party who is a present legal hold-
er of a mortgage, or his agent, may exercise the power of sale. “Any effort to foreclose 
by a party lacking ‘jurisdiction and authority’ to carry out a foreclosure under these 
statutes is void.”15
For U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo “to obtain the judicial declaration of clear title that 
they [sought] . . . they had to prove their authority to foreclose under the power of sale 
and show their compliance with the requirements on which this authority rests.”16 
Having failed to do so, they failed to demonstrate that they acquired good title to the 
properties.17
What is not apparent from this bare-bones narrative is the state of the real estate 
paperwork in these cases. In the Ibanez case, among other facts, the assignment of the 
mortgage to U.S. Bank was claimed to have occurred pursuant to a trust agreement, 
9 See id. at 44, 48. 
10 See id. at 44.
11 See id. 
12 See id. at 45, 49, 54. 
13 See id. at 49-50 (quoting Moore v. Dick, 72 N.E. 967 (Mass. 1905)).
14 See id. at 50.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 51.
17 See id. at 55.
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which was not in the record. A 273-page private placement memorandum (offering 
mortgage-backed securities to potential investors) was produced, but U.S. Bank could 
not produce any mortgage schedule identifying the Ibanez loan among the mortgages 
included. In addition, U.S. Bank never furnished any evidence that the entity allegedly 
assigning the mortgage to U.S. Bank – the Structured Asset Securities Corporation – ever 
held the mortgage.18 In the LaRace case, there was no document in the record reflect-
ing an assignment of the LaRace mortgage by Option One, the original entity, to 
Bank of America. There was an unexecuted copy of a mortgage loan purchase agree-
ment, which purported to transfer the pooled mortgages from Bank of America to 
ABFC. However, although the agreement makes reference to a schedule listing the as-
signed mortgage loans, that schedule was not a part of the trial court record. Wells 
Fargo submitted a schedule that it represented to identify the assigned loans, but it 
contained no property addresses, names of mortgagors, or any number that corre-
sponded to the loan number or servicing number of the LaRace property.19
Two concurring justices wrote of the “utter carelessness with which the plaintiff 
banks documented the titles to their assets.”20 The justices did not call into question 
the fact that the mortgagors of the properties in question had defaulted on their obli-
gations. However, the justices expressed that prior to commencing a foreclosure 
action:
the holder of an assigned mortgage needs to . . . ensure that his 
legal paperwork is in order. Although there was no apparent actual 
unfairness here to the mortgagors, that is not the point. Foreclosure 
is a powerful act with significant consequences, and Massachusetts 
law has always required that it proceed strictly in accord with the 
statutes that govern it.
The justices noted that this is particularly true in a state such as Massachusetts, which 
permits foreclosure without judicial supervision.21
A second case of this type, Bank of  New York v. Raftogianis,22 was decided by the 
Superior Court of New Jersey last year. The Bank of New york brought an action to 
foreclose on a mortgage taken out by Michael Raftogianis and Roman Krywopusk, 
who had borrowed $1,380,000 from American Home Acceptance, with the debt me-
morialized by a note and mortgage executed on September 30, 2004. The mortgage 
described the “Lender” as American Home Acceptance. There was also mention of 
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”), which is a private corpora-
tion which administers a national electronic registry of mortgage interests and servic-
ing rights in mortgage loans.23 In the mortgage, MERS was described as “a separate 
corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and 
assigns.”24 The mortgage was recorded with the county clerk on October 20, 2004.25
18 See id. at 46-47, 52.
19 See id. at 48, 52.
20 See id. at 55-56 (Cordy, J., concurring, with whom Batsford, J., joined).
21 See id.
22 13 A.3d 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010).
23  See id. at 442, 440.
24  Id. at 442. 
25  See id.
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American Home Mortgage subsequently sold its interests in a group of mortgage 
loans to American Home Mortgage Securities, LLC. The Mortgage Loan Purchase 
Agreement that effectuated this transaction contemplated an additional transfer of 
these mortgage loans to the American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 
Mortgage Backed Notes, Series 2004-4. The court found that the note and mortgage 
were securitized without notice to the borrowers.26
The court’s description of this transaction, and the documents that accomplished 
it, presents a picture of complexity that makes the foreclosure process essentially inac-
cessible to many mortgagors. The description also suggests confusion and lax proce-
dures operating to the detriment of mortgagors.
In or about December 2004, a group of mortgage loans held by 
American Home Acceptance were securitized. While the court is 
now satisfied that defendant’s loan was among that group . . . , that 
was not at all clear from the documents initially submitted by 
plaintiff . . . . The securitization of the loan was not referenced in 
the [foreclosure] complaint, or even in plaintiff’s initial motion for 
summary judgment. (Judges and lawyers who regularly handle 
foreclosure litigation would probably recognize that the matter in-
volved a loan which had been securitized just from the description 
of plaintiff in the complaint, such as “The Bank of New york as 
Trustee for American Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 Mortgage 
Backed Notes, Series 2004-4.” There is no apparent reason, how-
ever, why a layperson not familiar with the securitization process 
would recognize that.) . . .
The documents provided in this case are typical of those presented 
in other matters involving the securitization of mortgage loans. 
Those documents are lengthy, complex, and difficult to under-
stand. Included in the materials ultimately provided was a 
Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, an Amended and Restated 
Trust Agreement, an Indenture, and a Servicing Agreement. (The 
Indenture in this case is in excess of 100 pages, without attach-
ments. An attachment which simply defines the terms used in the 
Indenture itself contains fifty-five pages.) . . . The transfers or as-
signments of the underlying mortgage loans involve other 
complexities.27
Raftogianis and Krywopusk defaulted on the mortgage in October, 2008. The 
complaint to foreclose was filed on February 9, 2009. The complaint stated that the 
Bank of New york became owner of the note and mortgage “before the . . . complaint 
was drafted.” The complaint did not refer to the securitization of the loan, any of the 
entities involved in the securitization process, or any transfer from either American 
Home Acceptance or MERS. The complaint also provided no information as to who 
was then in physical possession of the note. Krywopusk filed an answer, counterclaim, 
26  See id. at 443, 437.
27  See id. at 443.
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and cross claim on May 6, 2009.28 After the complaint to foreclose was filed, an 
“Assignment of Mortgage” was executed from MERS to the Bank of New york, as 
Trustee. The assignment referred to the mortgage securing the Raftogianis/Krywopusk 
note.29
The Bank of New york moved for summary judgment in January, 2010. “The mo-
tion was based on a certification from plaintiff’s counsel providing copies of the note, 
the mortgage, and the February 2009 [post-complaint] assignment.”30 The subsequent 
struggle to determine the rudimentary facts of the chain of transactions was described 
by the court:
Defendant filed written opposition, challenging the validity of the 
MERS assignment. Plaintiff responded with a certification execut-
ed by a supervisor for American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc., 
the servicer for the loan. While that . . . recited that the note and 
mortgage had previously been sold to plaintiff, it did that in con-
clusory terms. No additional documentation was provided. 
Neither plaintiff’s motion nor plaintiff’s reply to defendant’s op-
position addressed the securitization of the debt, or the transfer or 
negotiation of the underlying note. The court then required the 
production of the documents executed as a part of the securitiza-
tion process. The motion was adjourned.31
The court’s subsequent frustration with Bank of New york’s inability to document 
the relevant transactions continued, amidst a flurry of document production and con-
flicting claims about the possibility of producing relevant documentation. In the end, 
the Bank of New york never established that it had possession of the Raftogianis/
Krywopusk note as of the date that the foreclosure action was filed.32
Since physical possession of the note was required (under New Jersey law) to com-
mence a foreclosure action, the court held that the Bank of New york failed to estab-
lish that it had the right to initiate the action. It further held that establishment of 
later possession could not retroactively rectify the situation. The court emphasized 
that “[t]he date of filing can affect substantive rights, and those involved should have 
the ability to confirm that filing was proper.”33 For instance, under New Jersey law, “a 
debtor’s right to cure a default with respect to a residential mortgage, without being 
responsible for the lender’s fees and costs, will end when the complaint is filed. . . . 
Similarly, . . . [New Jersey law] provides that certain borrowers facing foreclosure have 
the right to a six month forbearance, effective with the filing of a foreclosure 
complaint.”34
The court held that “[p]laintiff was required to establish one basic fact – that as of 
the time the complaint was filed, it or its agent did have possession of the note on 
which the action was based.”35 The burden of proof on this issue rested with the Bank 
28  See id. at 442, 445.
29  See id. at 445. 
30  See id.
31  See id. at 445-46.
32 See id. at 452.
33 See id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 459.
 The Journal of the ACS Issue Groups 137 
of New york. Having failed in its proof, the foreclosure complaint was dismissed 
without prejudice. Any new complaint would have to be accompanied by a certifica-
tion confirming that the Bank of New york was then in physical possession of the 
original Raftogianis/Krywopusk note.36
In a later case, Wells Fargo Bank v. Ford,37 the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled 
against a purported assignee of a mortgage on similar facts. In that case, Sandra Ford 
borrowed $403,750 from Argent Mortgage Company and gave a mortgage on her 
residence in Westwood, New Jersey, to secure the loan. Five days later, Argent pur-
portedly assigned the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo Bank. When Ford allegedly 
stopped making payments about one year later, Wells Fargo brought a court action to 
foreclose on the property. Ford, appearing pro se, responded that Argent committed 
predatory and fraudulent acts in connection with the loan and mortgage, and that the 
assignment to Wells Fargo was invalid.38
Wells Fargo subsequently brought a motion for summary judgment. Ford filed a 
cross motion for summary judgment, alleging that documents produced by Wells 
Fargo in the litigation were forgeries, and that she had been overcharged more than 
$20,000 in closing costs at the time of closing.39
The Superior Court held that Wells Fargo failed to establish its standing to pursue 
the foreclosure action. Under New Jersey law, “‘[a]s a general proposition, a party 
seeking to foreclose a mortgage must own or control the underlying debt.’”40 In this 
case, Wells Fargo could produce no endorsement of the Ford note by Argent to Wells 
Fargo. In addition, there was no certification by a Wells Fargo officer that, on the basis 
of personal knowledge, Wells Fargo was the holder and owner of the note. A pur-
ported assignment of the mortgage which was produced “was not authenticated in 
any manner; it was simply attached to a reply brief.”41 Absent such proof, Wells Fargo 
could not foreclose.
The final case in this cluster was decided by the Supreme Court of New york last 
year. In this case, Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. McRae,42 Terry McRae bor-
rowed $45,000 from First Franklin, a Division of National City Bank of Indiana, in 
July, 2006. This debt was memorialized by a note and was secured by a mortgage on 
McRae’s real property in Almond, New york.43
McRae allegedly defaulted on the loan and Deutsche Bank commenced a foreclo-
sure action on January 21, 2009. Deutsche Bank made an application for an order of 
reference, which was denied by the Supreme Court. The ground cited was Deutsche 
Bank’s “fail[ure] to submit evidence of the proper assignment or delivery of the 
Mortgage and/or Note.”44
36 See id.
37 15 A.3d 327 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
38 See id. at 328.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 329 (quoting Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435).
41 See id. at 331.
42 894 N.y.S.2d 720 (N.y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
43 See id. at 720.
44 See McRae, 894 N.y.S.2d. at 721. See also N.y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 1321 (Consol. 1963) (allowing 
plaintiff to request an Order of Reference in the event that a defaulting borrower does not file an appear-
ance within the time allotted, which sends the foreclosure case to a referee to determine the full amount 
owed by the borrower, if the property can be sold as one parcel, etc.).
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The court described how, under New york law, a plaintiff in a foreclosure action 
“must establish the existence of the mortgage and mortgage note, ownership of the 
mortgage, and the defendant’s default in payment . . . .”45 “A mortgage can be as-
signed in two ways – by the delivery of the bond and mortgage . . . to the assignee with 
the intention that all ownership interests [are] thereby transferred, or by a written in-
strument of assignment.”46 Neither was demonstrated in this case. There was no 
proof offered that Deutsche Bank held the note and mortgage when the action was 
commenced. In the alternative, the written assignment on which Deutsche Bank relied 
was defective. Although the assignment purportedly assigned the mortgage, it did not 
assign the underlying obligation. When the court indicated that this situation was 
insufficient, Deutsche Bank submitted a new copy of the note, “which for the first 
time contained an endorsement by First Franklin . . . to First Franklin Financial 
Corporation, and an endorsement in blank by First Franklin Financial Corporation.” 
However, this endorsement in blank was undated. “In stark contrast,” the court wrote, 
“the copy of the Note attached to the complaint bears no such endorsements. 
Obviously, the endorsements were made in response [to the court’s order] . . . , which 
post-date the commencement of this case . . . , and are ineffective” to ground the filing 
of the action.47
In dismissing the case, the court explained the policy reasons for its action:
[t]oday, with multiple (and often unrecorded) assignments of 
mortgage obligations and multiple securitizations often related to 
the same debt, the courts should carefully scrutinize the status of 
parties who claim the right to enforce these mortgage obligations. 
For the unrepresented homeowner, the issues of standing and real 
party in interest status of the foreclosing party are never consid-
ered. Without such scrutiny, there is a risk that the courts will give 
the judicial ‘seal of approval’ to foreclosures against unrepresented 
homeowners who have little, if any, understanding of these issues, 
much less the legal significance [of them] . . . .48
III. POINTLESS PROCEDURAL HURDLES OR THE PROTECTION OF 
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS?
Before assessing the desirability of the Ibanez decision and the others like it, we 
posit several preliminary points. First, in none of these decisions were the founda-
tional legal principles on which they turned anything surprising or new. In each case, 
the court simply applied long established principles – such as the idea that a foreclos-
ing party must have a present legal right to do so – in reaching the decision that it 
reached. In no area of the law can a party bring an action, claiming breach of a con-
tract under which it has no present legal rights. Requiring that claimed mortgage as-
signees or securitization trustees must actually possess the mortgage interests that 
they assert is simply the implementation of a routine legal principle.
Second, the fact that traditional legal rules support a particular result does not, of 
course, mean that those rules cannot be altered in particular contexts by courts. That 
45 Id. at 722.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 723 (emphasis deleted).
48 Id. at 724.
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is, essentially, what the foreclosing parties in these cases requested. Although decades 
of law might require – on its face – the dismissals of these actions, the foreclosing par-
ties argued that the complexities of mortgage securitization and multiple assignments 
in blank require flexibility in the enforcement of what are essentially hyper-technical-
ities in this context. The law in these states might require that the foreclosing party 
have a written assignment or actual, physical possession of the mortgage or indebted-
ness note. However, there was no real dispute in any of these cases that the foreclosing 
parties were – with the exception of some missing paperwork – the parties who were 
entitled to do so.
Finally, there was no evidence in any of these cases that the property owners had 
not, in fact, defaulted. In all of these cases, the property owners implicitly conceded 
that they had stopped making payments, often for substantial periods. If there was 
unfairness in the bringing of these foreclosure actions, it was not rooted in the factual 
question of default.
Indeed, one could argue, all that was accomplished in these cases was a temporary 
delay of the inevitable. In each of these cases, the complaint was dismissed by the 
court without prejudice, meaning that the case could be re-filed. The foreclosing par-
ties could simply cure the technical defect – obtain the written assignment or find the 
missing documents – and file for foreclosure again.
Are there – therefore – any valid reasons for the decisions in these cases?
There are, in fact, several important principles that these decisions embody – prin-
ciples that are critical to the law in this area, and broader questions of public policy.
A.  A home moRtgAge deAlS with ShelteR; AS A ReSult, it iS A PARtiCulAR 
kind of ContRACt thAt iS imBued with PARtiCulARly imPoRtAnt 
SoCiAl iSSueS And imPeRAtiveS.
In the Ibanez case and at least one other,49 the mortgages that were threatened with 
foreclosure were on the debtors’ homes. The individual and societal importance of 
individuals’ homes has always been recognized in American law and policy. It is recog-
nized in bankruptcy laws, income tax laws, property tax rates, federal mortgage lend-
ing standards, and a myriad of other contexts. In the Ibanez case, the court explicitly 
recognized this factor. It stressed that the securitization of mortgages does not justify 
carelessness in foreclosure procedures; those mortgages still convey “legal title to 
someone’s home or farm, and must be treated as such.”50 In the McRae case, the court 
cited mortgage reform legislation in New york in support of its decision. This legisla-
tion stated, explicitly, that “‘it is the expressed policy of the state to preserve and 
guard . . . the social as well as the economic value of home ownership.’”51
The foreclosure crisis of the past three years has certainly intensified awareness of 
the importance of fairness in residential loans, and the individual and societal costs of 
loss of home ownership. However, the underlying principle–of the importance of hu-
man shelter–has long informed our nation’s public policy, and the law’s treatment of 
foreclosure.
49 See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 46, 47, 52; Ford, 15 A.3d at 328.
50 Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 51-52.
51 McRae, 894 N.y.S.2d at 721 (quoting N.y. Real Prop. Law § 265-a(1)(b) (Consol. 2007)).
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B. in foReCloSuRe ACtionS – PARtiCulARly thoSe thAt involve 
multiPle ASSignmentS And SeCuRitized loAnS – the BuRden of 
PRoof RegARding the Right to foReCloSuRe muSt Be PlACed on the 
foReCloSing PARty.
The Ibanez and similar cases discussed here all illustrate two basic truths: (1) com-
plex real estate transactions with multiple (and often undocumented) assignments 
and the securitization of thousands of mortgages are beyond the assumed under-
standing of any layperson; and (2) as a result, proof of these transactions, and the 
claimed right to foreclose, must lie with the foreclosing party.
The complexities of the transactions involved in this cluster of cases, and the seem-
ing attitude (of the financial institutions involved) that property owners need not be 
made aware of them, are not unique; they are currently rife throughout the industry. 
During the past decade, when mortgage lending became a scramble for quick profits 
by loan originators who had no intention of holding and servicing loans, documenta-
tion of the millions of assignments and securitizations involved has been by-and-large 
abysmal. The problems that were present in these cases – missing documents, assign-
ments in blank, unrecorded assignments, post-transaction documentation, and oth-
ers – have been discovered in foreclosure challenges in many states, and have been the 
subject of many critical court opinions.
With such rampant problems, the approach that was taken in Ibanez and the other 
cases is the only one that is sensible: the burden of proving the right to foreclose must 
be placed on the foreclosing party. If a remote assignee or securitization trustee claims 
the right to foreclose, it must prove the legal basis for that claim. It cannot be the case 
that a remote party can claim the right to foreclose, with the property owner then 
forced to disprove its entitlement to that action. All of the documents and other 
knowledge of complex transactions are (to the extent that they exist) in the possession 
of the foreclosing party. As a result, as a practical matter – as well as a matter of fair-
ness – the burden of proving the right to foreclose must be borne by the foreclosing 
party.
Granting the property owner an entitlement to proof of the transactions involved 
is, of course, only as good as his ability to enforce it. This leads to the third important 
principle in this context:
C. in CASeS involving multiPle ASSignmentS And/oR SeCuRitized 
loAnS, JudiCiAl oveRSight of the foReCloSuRe PRoCeSS iS CRitiCAl.
In mortgage foreclosure cases involving multiple assignments and securitized 
loans, a property owner who receives notice of foreclosure from a remote third party 
or securitization trustee is placed in an impossible situation. Is this party, from whom 
notice is received, the one actually (legally) entitled to foreclose? If not, and the fore-
closure proceeds, the property owner might well remain liable (under the terms of the 
loan) to the legally entitled party. With whom should the property owner deal, in rais-
ing defenses or seeking modification of loan terms under state or federal mandatory 
mediation or foreclosure protection programs?
To ensure answers to such questions, and to implement mandatory mediation 
laws, judicial oversight of the foreclosure process is critical. For instance, in response 
to the foreclosure crisis, several states have enacted statutes that mandate negotiations 
between property owners and mortgage holders in an attempt to avert foreclosure. In 
New york, a new statute requires that a court hold a mandatory conference before 
foreclosure on high-cost or sub-prime home loans, with the purpose being “to allow 
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the parties to reach agreement on an alternative to foreclosure.”52 In Maine, recent 
legislation has created the Foreclosure Mediation Program, which provides a default-
ing borrower with the opportunity to enter into negotiations with the lender, super-
vised by a trained and impartial mediator, in which loss-mitigation strategies and the 
possibility of avoiding the foreclosure action are discussed.53
Attempts by property owners to negotiate settlements and avoid foreclosure have 
been stymied repeatedly by the claims of remote third parties and loan servicers who 
claim that they have no authority to negotiate. To force production of proof of the 
right to foreclose, and to require good faith participation by lenders in negotiation, 
judicial oversight is critical. In addition, the obligation to invoke judicial oversight of 
the foreclosure process should rest with the foreclosing party. The property owner, 
with generally little information and less expertise, should not be in the position of 
having to hire a lawyer to stop the foreclosure process and invoke the court’s protec-
tion. If a remote assignee or securitization trustee desires to foreclose, it should be 
required to file a court action to do so.
The logic behind this principle is obvious in those jurisdictions that require judicial 
supervision and approval of all foreclosure actions. However, it is not traditionally a 
part of the law in those jurisdictions that do not require a claimed mortgage holder to 
submit to the judicial process. In the approximately 29 “non-judicial foreclosure” 
states, a mortgage holder is empowered to proceed to foreclosure and sale if the mort-
gage grants the lender that power. Since “non-judicial sale” is a mortgage term that 
homeowners are very unlikely to appreciate, or feel that they can negotiate, it is safe 
to assume that most mortgage loans in those states grant lenders that power. Indeed, 
in the cases of the Ibanez and LaRace loans, the properties were foreclosed and sold 
prior to any judicial involvement. Judicial scrutiny of the foreclosures in those cases 
occurred only because – months after the sale – the purported mortgage holders chose 
to initiate quiet title actions. Had they not done so, it is highly unlikely that proof of 
the right to foreclose, required by the Ibanez court, would ever have been required.54
“Non-judicial foreclosure” statutes are based on the assumption that mortgage 
foreclosures are relatively simple affairs between two contracting parties, with rela-
tively simple facts about payment. This might have described most residential mort-
gage transactions twenty years ago. However, in the world of real estate financing in 
the twenty-first century, this model reflects none of the realities of most transactions. 
To give claimed mortgage holders the right to foreclose and sell the properties – unless 
homeowners can guess that the foreclosing party is unauthorized, and know that they 
52 See McRae, 894 N.y.S.2d at 249 (discussing N.y. C.P.L.R. § 3408 (Consol. 2008)).
53 See 14 ME. REV. sTAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A, 6322 (2009). Pursuant to Maine’s Foreclosure Mediation 
Program, if the borrower chooses to initiate the mediation process, no judgment authorizing the foreclo-
sure and sale of the property can be entered until the mediator’s report is completed and filed with the 
court. If the parties are unable to come to come to terms with a strategy to avoid further proceedings dur-
ing mediation, the ensuing mediator’s report reflects that an agreement could not be reached and the court 
may then enter a judgment of foreclosure in favor of the lender. Similar legislation has been enacted in 
several other states. See, e.g., N.y. C.P.L.R. § 3408 (Consol. 2008); MAss. gEN. LAws ch. 244, § 35A (2008); 
N.J. sTAT. ANN. § 46:10B-50 (2009).
54 In Massachusetts, a solution has been sought for at least one subset of loans, sub-prime loans. The 
Massachusetts Attorney General and Massachusetts courts have attempted to force pre-sale negotiation 
in the case of sub-prime loans for individual homes, by labeling them “presumptively unfair” and the 
product of deceptive trade practices in violation of general consumer protection statutes. See 
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008).
142 Advance
have the right to negotiation, and can afford to hire an attorney to file in court – is 
unrealistic in today’s world and represents poor public policy.
Naysayers will point out that long foreclosure delays characterize the current situ-
ation in some states which require judicially approved foreclosures. Because of the 
spiraling number of defaults on mortgage loans in the past three years, delays in ac-
complishing foreclosures in New Jersey and New york, for instance, now exceed an 
average of three years.55 This has, in turn, depressed prices for the sales of non-dis-
tressed properties and created blocks of blight in some cities.56 Judicial review of 
foreclosures is, however, only part of the problem; other causes include the disorgani-
zation of assignment and securitization records, and uncertainty about foreclosure 
rules on both the state and federal levels.57 In addition, disputes about responsibility 
for deteriorating homes in the process of foreclosure mirrors problems in the foreclo-
sure process itself. In Los Angeles, the City has sued Deutsche Bank, “one of the 
country’s largest trustees of mortgage-backed securities, seek[ing] hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in penalties.” The Bank is accused of “illegally forcing out tenants, 
allowing others to live in deplorable conditions and letting scores of empty homes 
devolve into havens for gang members, squatters and drug dealers.” The Bank’s de-
fense? The City has sued the wrong party. “Loan servicers, not Deutsche, which is the 
trustee for the properties, are responsible for the maintenance of the properties, said 
[a Deutsche] spokesman . . . .”58
There are potential costs to any course of action. The question is whether the ef-
ficiency of non-judicial foreclosures in moving foreclosed properties justifies the costs 
that come with rapid, non-supervised foreclosure powers exercised by alleged third-
party assignees and securitization trustees. The better answer is that it does not.
IV. CONCLUSION
Neither Ibanez, nor any of the other cases discussed here, forbids mortgage secu-
ritization, multiple mortgage and note assignments, or other complex real estate fi-
nancing transactions. Indeed, the Ibanez court itself stressed that a securitization 
trustee could be shown as a proper assignee if there is a trust agreement which clearly 
and specifically identifies the mortgage at issue as among those assigned to the trust.59 
The issue is not the blanket forbidding of complex transactions; it is the protection of 
all rights, including those of the property owner, when default and foreclosure are 
claimed.
55 See, e.g., Julie Schmit, Housing Market Recovery Could Be Stalled: Researcher Cites Foreclosure 
Delays, Which Give Troubled Borrowers Prolonged Time in Homes, UsA ToDAy, July 14, 2011, at 2A.
56 See id.; see also Brady Dennis, There Goes the Foreclosed-on Neighborhood, ThE PoRTLAND 
PREss hERALD, July 1, 2011, at A2.
57 See Schmit, supra note 55.
58 See Dennis, supra note 56.
59 See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53.
